Various properties of preferential election rules are described, including nine forms of monotonicity. It is shown that Condorcet's principle is incompatible with many of them. Some progress is made towards the task of determining all maximal mutually compatible subsets of these properties. To that end, a survey is given of the monotonicity properties of many known single-seat preferential election rules, and four new rules are described, including one that is offered as a more monotonic practical alternative to the Alternative Vote.
Introduction
It is well known [4, lo] that the Single Transferable Vote (STV) fails various tests of monotonicity.
A major unsolved problem is whether there exist rules that retain the important political features of STV and are also more monotonic. Because this is such a difficult problem in general, I concentrate here on the special case of singleseat elections, in which STV reduces to AV, the Alternative Vote. However, the basic definitions are given (in Section 2) and the properties are described (in Section 3) in a form that applies equally well to multi-seat elections. Two impossibility theorems are proved in Section 4, which show that various properties, including Condorcet's principle, are incompatible with many forms of monotonicity.
The monotonicity properties of many single-seat election rules are surveyed in Sections 5-7: some known non-Condorcet rules in Section 5, some Condorcet-type rules (including two new ones, PMM and MMG) in Section 6, and two new rules (QLTD and DAC) in Section 7. DAC is proposed as a more monotonic practical alternative to the Alternative Vote. A summary of properties is given in Table 1. 0166-218X/97/$17.00 0 A997 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved PIISO166-218)3(96)00100-X
Definitions

Terminology and axioms jbr ekction rules
Candidates will be denoted by lower-case letters a, b, c, . . . Each voter casts a ballot containing a preference listing of the candidates, which is written as (for example) abc, to denote that the voter places a first, b second and c third, with no fourth choice being expressed. A preference listing is complete if it includes all candidates, and truncated otherwise. A projile is a weighted family of preference listings, such as might represent the ballots cast in an election. Profiles are represented as for Elections 1 and 2 below, indicating either the proportion, or the absolute number, of ballots of each type cast. In an election to fill s seats from n candidates, an outcome is a set of s candidates; so there are (:) different outcomes. As in [20], a (preferential) election rule (for filling s seats) is a function that associates with each profile a probability space on the set of corresponding outcomes. The 'normal' situation is that all outcomes are given probability 0 except for one, which has probability 1; if anything else happens, then we say that the result is a tie between all the outcomes that have non-zero probability. For example, if AV is used for Election 1 above, then it elects a with probability i, and b and c with probability i each; and if STV is used for Election 2, then it elects {a, b} with probability $ and {c,e} and {d,e} with probability i each. This definition implies that every election rule is anonymous, meaning that the result depends only on the number of ballots of each type in the profile. It is neutral (hence, being anonymous, it is symmetric) if, whenever a permutation is applied to the names of the candidates on all the ballots, then the same permutation is applied to the result. It is homogeneous if the result depends only on the proportion of ballots of each type, not on their absolute number. And it is discriminating if, for every possible set of preference listings, the proportion of profiles that give rise to a tie, out of all profiles that include only preference listings from that set, tends to zero as the number of voters in the profile tends to infinity. (This is a rather stronger form of discrimination than is usually imposed, but we shall need it in the proof of Theorem 3. The imposition of discrimination in any form rules out systems that use random selection as an intrinsic feature and not just as a last resort; such systems are of great interest [ 1, 81 but they are outside the scope of this work.) A proper election rule is one that is symmetric, homogeneous and discriminating.
Henceforth we shall consider only proper election rules.
Note that election rules involving transfers of fractional votes are seldom homogeneous in practice, because replicating each ballot a large number of times will reduce the effect of any rounding errors. We shall count an election rule as proper if an idealized version of it is proper, even though a specific implementation of it may not be.
Notation ,fkw profiles
We shall always denote the set of candidates by C, the number of seats (= the number of candidates to be elected) by s, the total number of votes (= ballots in the profile) by c, the number of ballots containing candidate x by L(X), and the number with x in ith place by u;(x). The Droop quota is v/(s + 1). A voter, ballot or preference listing prefers x to y if he, she or it lists x above (before) y, or lists x but not y. We write S(X) for the set of voters who are solidly committed to a set X C C, that is, who prefer every candidate in X to every candidate not in X (see [7] ). We write E(X) for the set of candidates in X who are elected (by the election rule currently under consideration);
P( ]FIE(X)] 3 1) is the probability that this number is positive, and Pn(x) = P(IE({x})] = 1) is the probability that candidate x is elected.
We write g(x, y) for x's gross mujority over y, that is, the number of voters who prefer x to y. Then n(x, y) = g(x, y) -g(y,x) is x's net mujority over y. We define the minimum gross score mings(x), minimum net score minns(x) and musimum net untiscore maxna(x) of candidate x by mings(x) = min g(x,y), JEC\{,Y} maxna(x) = ,:y'; l ~(YJ>. r Clearly minns(x) = -maxna(x) minns(x) = min n(x, v), ?,EC\{Il and, in the absence of truncated preference listings, mings(x) = i(tl + minns(x)); but there is no direct connection between mings(x) and minns(x) in general.
Properties of election rules
It is convenient to divide these into global or absolute properties on the one hand, and local or relutive properties on the other. The former say something about the result of applying an election rule to a single profile, whereas the latter say how the result should (or should not) change when certain changes are made to the profile.
Global or absolute properties
The essential feature of STV, which makes it a system of proportional representation (within each constituency), is what I call the Droop proportionality criterion or DPC.
The single-seat version of DPC is what 1 call MAJORITY. PLURALITY is a rather weak property that surely must hold in any real election.
l DPC. If, for some integer k and set X 2 C satisfying 0 < k < 1x1, /S(X)1 exceeds k Droop quotas, then I/Z(X)1 3 k (with probability 1).
We say that x beats y or ties with y (in pairwise comparisons) if n(x, y) (defined in Section 2.2) satisfies n(x, y) >0 or = 0, respectively. A Condorcet winner (resp.
Condorcet non-loser) [5]
is a candidate who beats (resp., beats or ties with) every other candidate in pairwise comparisons; note that all Condorcet non-losers (if any) must tie with each other. The Condorcet top tier is the smallest non-empty set T C C such that every candidate in T beats every candidate (if any) outside T. (This concept was apparently first introduced by Nanson [ 151.) Let W (resp. L) be the set of Condorcet winners (non-losers).
Then 1 WI < 1 and L C T, and if 1 WI = 1 then W = L = T. Condorcet's principle and the two strengthenings of it given below were formulated originally for single-seat elections in which every voter provides a complete preference listing; but I have reworded them here so that they make sense (even if they are not necessarily sensible) for all preferential elections. Note that SMITH-C• NDORCET and EXCLUSIVE-C• NDORCET both imply CONDORCET, and SMITH~CONDORCET also implies MAJORITY. It is easy to see that, in multi-seat elections, DPC and CONDORCE~ are mutually incompatible. Many authors have found CONDORCET an attractive principle for single-seat elections, although others [9] have found it less plausible, and we shall see in Theorem 2 that it conflicts with many monotonicity properties.
Local or relative propertie,,
We shall say that a candidate x is helped or harmed by a change in the profile if the result is, respectively, to increase or to decrease &(I).
The following two properties are well known to hold for STV. l LATER-NO-HELP. Adding a later preference to a ballot should not help any candidate already listed.
l LATER-NO-HARM. Adding a later preference to a ballot should not harm any candidate already listed.
Next we come to the different versions of monotonicity. The basic theme is that a candidate x should not be harmed by a change in the profile that appears to give more There is also the following property, which is not strictly a form of monotonicity but is very close to it (and is again reworded here for multi-seat elections).
For X s C, the addition of further ballots that are solidly committed to X should not reduce P(]E(X)( >, 1).
All the monotonicity properties seem superficially desirable, except that, as explained in [20], 1 do not think that MONO-REMOVE-BOTTOM is desirable in multi-seat elections.
Of course, any of these properties may be undesirable in practice if it turns out to have undesirable consequences. MONO-RAISE-RANDOM, in particular, is very restrictive.
Among many questions that I cannot answer is whether there exists an election rule that satisfies both MONO-RAISE-RANDOM and MAJORITY; if not, then I would certainly regard MAJORITY as the more important property to preserve. Moreover, in single-seat elections,
Also, if truncated prejerence listings are not allowed, then
Proof. These are all straightforward. 0
Impossibility theorems
We shall prove two multi-part impossibility theorems. Note that if a number of properties are compatible in general, then in particular they must be compatible for single-seat elections, and so it suffices to prove their incompatibility in this case. We shall assume throughout that all election rules are proper. Consider Election 3. By symmetry, the result must be a 3-way tie; but, by the axiom of discrimination, there must be a profile P arbitrarily close to this (in the proportions of ballots of each type) that does not yield a tie. Without loss of generality, suppose a is elected in P. But c becomes the Condorcet winner, and so must be elected by CONDORCET, if half the but ballots in P are replaced by abc and half by acb (contrary to MONO-RAISE-RANDOM and MONO-SUB-TOP), or if all the abc ballots are replaced by a (contrary to LATER-NO-HELP), or if all the bat ballots are replaced by a (contrary to MONO-RAISE-DELETE and MONO-SUB-PLUMP), or if all the abc ballots are replaced by acb (contrary to LATER-NO-HELP and LATER-NO-HARM together). This proves (a), (c) and three parts of (b).
Suppose we modify the profile in Election 3 by deleting the second and third choices from all the abc, bca and cub ballots. Again, there must be a profile P' arbitrarily close to the modified profile that does not yield a tie, and we may suppose w.1.o.g. that a is x7 elected in P'. But b becomes the Condorcet winner if we replace the a ballots in P' by ubc, contrary to LATER-NO-HARM.
Finally, consider Election 4. Again, even if this yields a tie, there must be a profile P" arbitrarily close to it that does not. By PLURALITY, a cannot be elected in P" (because of c); by CONDORCET and MONO-ADD-TOP, b cannot be elected, because adding two hrr ballots would make a the Condorcet winner; and similarly c cannot be elected, because adding five ch ballots would make b the Condorcet winner. This contradiction completes the proof. 0
We shall see in later examples that CONDOKCET (with or without PLURALITY) is compat- Thus it suffices to prove the incompatibility using the first property mentioned in each of (i)-(iii). We write P(X + x) for the probability that x is elected (by the rule currently under consideration) in profile X. by LATER-NO-HELP, since P(Dl + a) tP(D1 -+ c) = 1 by MAJORITY. So P(Bt 4 c) 2 i whenever b and I: are sufficiently small. As in (ii), we can choose 6 and E so that (6/f IE/ < 0.001 and none of profiles Bi, B',, BJ and Bi result in a tie, and we may suppose that P(B3 ---) a) = 1 and can deduce from the above that P(Bl --) c) = 1. We can now follow the argument of (ii) to deduce that P(B6 + a) = 1, which implies that P(D3 + a) = 1 for suitable I, fi, 1'. Now 
Known non-Condorcet election rules
In the remainder of this paper we shall analyse a number of single-seat election rules, whose properties we summarize in Table 1 . In this section we consider several known rules not satisfying Condorcet's principle. In most cases it First-Preference Plurality (FPP), or First-Past-the-Post, elects the candidate x for whom z.i(x) is largest. To see that this does not satisfy MAJORITY or CONDOR~ET, consider Election 5, where FPP chooses c, but MAJORITY requires that a or b should be elected, and cl is the Condorcet winner. It is easy to see that FPP satisfies all the local properties we have mentioned, although it satisfies LATER-NO-HARM only if second and subsequent preferences are ignored totally, and not used to separate ties. (We shall describe election rules as if there is no tie; if there is a tie, that is, more than one candidate satisfies the specified criterion for election, then it is assumed that all such candidates are elected with equal probability. The Alternative Vote (AV) is the system where one repeatedly excludes the candidate with the smallest number of votes until there is only one candidate left, each vote being given at each stage to the first non-excluded candidate on the ballot. (If there is more than one candidate with the smallest number of votes, then one of them is chosen at random for exclusion. In practice one can stop as soon as some candidate has more than half the votes.) AV does not satisfy CONDORCET since it chooses b in Election 5, where a is the Condorcet winner. It is easy to see that it satisfies the other properties ticked in Proof. Among sets of mutually compatible properties that include both LATER-NO-HELP and LATER-NO-HARM, we see from Table 1 and Theorems 2 and 3 that the set of properties satisfied by FPP is the unique maximal set not containing MAJORITY, and the set satisfied by AV is the unique maximal set containing MAJORITY. q
Condorcet-based election rules
Naiiie rules
There is an obvious na'ive method of modifying the above rules so that they satisfy Condorcet's principle: exclude all candidates not in the Condorcet top tier (closing up the gaps in the preference listings when candidates are excluded from them), and apply FPP, PS or AV to the remaining candidates. (One could use ApV or ApAV instead, but only if truncated preference listings are allowed.) The resulting rules are described in Table 1 as C-FPP, C-PS and C-AV. It is easy to see that they all satisfy PLURALITY. They do not satisfy EXCLUSIVE-C• NDORCET: in Election 7, the Condorcet top tier is {a, b, c}, and all three rules elect c if k is large enough, whereas b is the unique Condorcet non-loser. However, the rules could easily be modified so that they do satisfy EXCLUSIVE-C• NDORCET, just by redefining the Condorcet top tier in the event that there are Condorcet non-losers. Fishbum [9] has modified a method of Black [2, p. 661 in just this way; the modified method, called B-F in Table 1 , is to declare the result a tie between all Condorcet non-losers if there are any, and otherwise to use PS (specifically, Borda counts). of candidates such that x is above y in the order 0 and x is preferred to y by the ballot /3. Although Y and MM look similar, MM depends only on the net scores n(x, y) -in fact, it elects the candidate x for whom maxna(x) (defined in Section 2.2) is minimal, whence the name minimax -whereas Y depends on the ballots themselves, since one cannot remove ballots that are not there. Nevertheless, the two methods have very similar properties. They both choose d in Election 9, showing that they do not satisfy MAJORITY or (therefore) SMITHCONDORCET, whereas it is not difficult to see that K does satisfy SMITHCONDORCET and hence MAJORITY. However, Y and MM satisfy EXCLUSIVE-C• NDORCET, whereas K does not as it stands (see [9] ), although it suffices to specify a suitable tie-breaking rule in order for K to do so. But none of the three satisfy PLURALITY, since all elect a in Election 4. The failure of K to satisfy MONO-ADD-TOP and MONO-REMOVE-BOTTOM follows from an example of Fishbum [9, p. 4841 , and the other entries in Table 1 all follow from Theorem 2.
PMM, or plurality-minimax
This is a rather heavy-handed modification of MM that satisfies CONDORCET, PLU-RALITY and MONO-REMOVE-BOTTOM (and is designed solely to prove that these three properties are mutually compatible). Say that a candidate x is debarred by PLURAL-ITY if u(x) < ~1 (y) for some other candidate y. Note that a candidate who is debarred by plurality remains so if some complete preference listings are removed from the profile; that is, adding complete preference listings cannot cause a candidate to become debarred who was not so before. Let Dp denote the set of candidates x such that x is debarred by plurality in the profile obtained by removing all ballots in which x is bottom, below all other candidates. Clearly Dp # C, since any candidate with the largest number of first-preference votes after all complete preference listings have been removed from the profile is in C\Dp. (If there are no truncated preference listings then Dp = 0.) PMM elects the candidate x in C\Dp for whom minns(x) is maximal. PMM clearly satisfies CONDORCET and PLURALITY. (A Condorcet winner cannot be in Dp.) It is easy to see that the winning candidate x cannot be moved into Dp if some ballots that have x bottom are removed, or if n is raised on some ballots, or if x is appended to some ballots that did not contain x, or if extra ballots are added that plump for x; and since these operations cannot decrease minns(x) nor increase minns(y) for any y # x, it follows that PMM satisfies the only four monotonicity properties that are possible for a rule that satisfies CONDORCET and PLURALITY.
MMG, or maximin gross
As we have seen, Condorcet-minimax (MM) elects the candidate x for whom maxna(_u)
is minimal, or, equivalently, for whom minns(x) is maximal. Like all Condorcet-based rules, it fails many forms of monotonicity, and so arguably it is not suitable for use when there are truncated preference listings. MMG is a workable system that, although it does not satisfy CONDORCET, can nevertheless be thought of as extending Condorcet's principle monotonically to profiles that include truncated preference listings. It elects the candidate x for whom mings(x) is maximal. Note that MMG agrees with MM. and hence satisfies CONDORCET and EXCLUSIVE-C• NDORCET, if all preference listings are complete; therefore three properties fail by Theorem 2(a). Note also that adding a candidate y at the end of a ballot already containing x can raise mings(y) but cannot change mings(x); thus MMG satisfies LATER-NO-HELP but not LATER-NO-HARM. and it is easy to see by the same reasoning that it satisfies the other monotonicity properties ticked in Table 1 . It also satisfies PLURALITY, because if a(x) < cl(y) then mings(x) < v(x) < cl(y) < mings(y). (ii) the set of properties sutisjied by MMG is also a maximal set.
Unanslt'ered questions
Proof. Assuming that the answer to Question 1 is negative, and considering only sets of mutually compatible properties that include CONDORCET, Theorem 2 shows that MM satisfies the unique maximal set containing MONO-ADD-TOP; PMM, the unique maximal set containing MONO-REMOVE-BOTTOM but not MONO-ADD-TOP; and C-PS, the unique maximal set containing neither of these. Finally, a negative answer to Question 1 implies a negative answer to Question 2, and now Theorem 2(c) shows that MMG satisfies a maximal set of compatible properties. 0
Needless to say, an affirmative answer to Question 1 would have no such consequences, and would leave open the determination of the maximal sets of mutually compatible properties satisfying CoNo0RcE.r.
New rules satisfying MAJORITY
QLTD, or quota-limited trickle-down
This rule is largely superseded by DAC (below), but I have included it here because it is simpler. For x E C and t > 0, let zj(x, t) = c/j, u;(x) + (t -Lt])urtl (x).
Let E(t) = {x E C: n(x, t) 2 iv}. If (exceptionally) E(t) = 8 for all t, then QLTD elects the candidate x for whom u(x) = v(x, ICI) is largest (as in ApV); otherwise let to = inf{t : E(t) # 0) and declare the result a tie between all candidates in E(to).
(Normally there will be just one.)
It is easy to see that QLTD satisfies PLURALITY, because if v(x) < VI(~) then v(x, t) d v(x) < u,(y) d u(y,t) for all t 3 1, and v(x,t) = tul(x) < tvl(y) = u(y,t) if t < 1. It satisfies MAJORITY as well, because if IS(X)1 > iv then v(x, 1x1) > iv if x E X and u(x, 1x1) < iv if x eX, so that to < 1x1 and E(to) LX. Many forms of monotonicity are obvious, since if x is the candidate elected then the changes involved will not decrease G'(x, t) nor increase u(v, t) for any y # x or any t. But MONO-ADD-TOP fails in Election 9, where to = 2.97 and a is elected, whereas if six extra ad ballots are added then to = 2.0 and d is elected. LATER-NO-HARM and the other monotonicity properties that fail, do so for broadly similar reasons. QLTD does not satisfy CONDORCET even when there are no truncated preference listings, since it elects a in Election 10, in which c is the Condorcet winner.
Election 10
Largest If X 2 C then A(X), the coalition acquiescing to X, comprises all voters who do not prefer any candidate not in X to any candidate in X. This includes S(X) (as in Section 2.2) together with those voters who vote for fewer than (XJ candidates in total, these forming a proper subset of X. In DAC one first lists all the acquiescing coalitions in decreasing order of size, and then takes the intersection of the corresponding sets of candidates from the top down (ignoring any set that would give empty intersection) until one is left with a single candidate. ( (keeping (,4( Y) i fixed for all Y #X) cannot decrease &(X) for any x E X, nor increase Pc(.u ) for any x @ X. To see that it satisfies PARTICIPATIOK, note that the effect of adding an extra ballot that is solidly committed to Y is to increase IA(X)\ for some sets X such that X C: Y or Y cX; the latter cannot decrease Pr(x) for any x in Y, and the former cannot increase PE(x) for any x not in Y, and so together they cannot decrease P(lE(Y)I a 1).
DAC seems to me to be a workable system (provided that the votes can be processed by computer) with almost all the properties that one could reasonably expect in a singleseat election rule. Among many unanswered questions, the following seem to me to be the most important: Question 4. Does there exist any multi-seat preferential election rule that satisfies DPC and all the properties satisfied by DAC except for MONO-REMOVE-BOTTOM, and that reduces to DAC in single-seat elections?
